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The present research attempted to modify Rest's
Defining Issues Test (DIT) in order to better differentiate
stage 6 moral reasoners from stage 5 reasoners.

A review

of the literature showed that the DIT seems to be both
reliable and valid, yet it is unable to clearly
differentiate between the stages of principled moral
reasoning.

After three pilot tests, newly developed stage

6 items were added to the DIT.

The revised DIT was then

administered to people believed to be stage 6 reasoners.
Of the 30 respondents, three made the stage 6 cutoff.

No

stage 6 items were shown to clearly differentiate between
stages 5 and 6.
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Chapter i
Introduction
The aim of this project is to develop stage 6 items
for Rest's Defining Issues Test (DIT) which differentiate
stage 6 reasoning from stage 5 reasoning.

The purpose is

to revise the DIT to make it possible to use this
instrument to identify those individuals who have attained
the highest level of moral reasoning.

A brief description

of Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory of moral
reasoning is given along with Kohlberg's method of
assessment.

James Rest's DIT is also described, and its

reliability, validity, and predictive utility are reviewed.
The theoretical and behavioral implications that stage 6
offers which stage 5 cannot offer are also discussed.
Finally, criteria are outlined which, if met by the new
stage 6 items, will provide items that only stage six
reasoners should use in making decisions about moral
dilemmas on the DIT.

Chapter II
An Overview of Kchlberg's Stages and Their Measurement
Kohlberg's Theory
Perhaps the most influential theory of moral
development has been the cognitive-developmental theory
proposed by Lawrence Kohlberg.

Kohlberg's (1969) theory

describes a six stage sequence in which persons progress
from lower to higher stages by a series of cognitive
restructurings or transformations.

Each transformation

produces qualitative changes that move the person toward
more comprehensive, complex modes of reasoning about moral
issues.

This developmental progression is marked by the

replacement of lower stage, less comprehensive modes of
reasoning by higher stage, more comprehensive modes.

These

sequential stages of moral development are believed to be
universal in that all persons, regardless of culture, pass
through the same developmental sequence.

Kohlberg divides

moral development into three levels:

preconventional,

conventional, and post-conventional.

Each level consists

of two stages with the second stage a more refined
organization of the first.

Each level and stage as defined

by Kohlberg is described in Table 1.
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Table 1
Kohlberg's Six Moral Stages

I.

Rreconventional Level
At this level the child is responsive to cultural

rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but
interprets these labels in terms of either the physical or
hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward,
exchange of favors), or in terms of the physical power of
those who enunciate the rules and labels.

The

preconventional level is divided into the following two
stages:
Stage 1:

The punishment and obedience orientation.

The physical consequences of action determine its goodness
or badness regardless of the human meaning or value of
these consequences.

Avoidance of punishment and

unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own
right, not in terms of respect to an underlying moral order
supported by punishment and authority (the latter being
Stage 4).
Stage 2:

The instrumental relativist orientation.

Right action consists of that which instrumentally satifies
one's needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human
relations are viewed in terms like those of the market
place.

Elements of fairness, of reciprocity, and/or equal

sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in
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physical, pragmatic ways.

Reciprocity is a matter of "you

scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty,
gratitude or justice.
II.

Conventional level
At this level, maintaining the expectations of the

individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as
valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and
obvious consequence.

That attitude is not only one of

conformity to personal expectations and social order, but
also of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting,
and justifying the order and of identifying with persons or
groups involved in it.

At this level, there are the

following two stages:
Stage 3:

The interpersonal concordance or "good

boy-nice girl" orientation.

Good behavior is that which

pleases or helps others and is approved by them.

There is

much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority
or "natural" behavior.

Behavior is frequently judged by

intention --"he means well" becomes important for the first
time.

One earns approval by being "nice."

Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation.

There is

orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the
maintenance of the social order.

Right behavior consists

of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and
maintaining the given social order for its own sake.
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III.

Postconventional, autonomous, or principled level.
At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral

values and principles which have validity and application
apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding
these principles, and apart from the individual's own
identification with these groups.

This level again has two

stages:
Stage 5:

The social-contract legalistic orientation,

generally with utilitarian overtones.

Right action tends

to be defined in terms of general individual rights, and
standards which have been critically examined and agreed
upon by the whole society.

There is a clear awareness of

the relativism of personal values and opinions and a
corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching
consensus.

Aside from what is constitutionally and

democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of
personal "values" and "opinions."

The result is an

emphasis upon the "legal point of view," but with an
emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms cf
rational considerations of social utility (rather than
freezing it in terms of stage 4 "law and order").

Outside

the legal realm, free agreement and contract is the binding
element of obligation.

This is the "official" morality of

the American government and constitution.
Stage 6:

The universal ethical principle orientation.

Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord
with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical

6
comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency.

These

principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the
categorical imperatives):

they are not concrete moral

rules like the Ten Commandments.

At least, these are

universal principles of justice, of reciprocity, and
equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of
human beings as individual persons.

From:

Kohlberg, L. (1973). The claim to moral adequacy of
a highest stage of moral judgment.
Philosophy, 70, 631-632.

The Journal of
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In his later elaborations, Kohlberg subdivided each
stage into A and B substages.

This distinction was to be

helpful in the attempt to relate moral judgment to moral
action -- that is, that subjects using B-substage reasoning
would be more likely to engage in the moral action they
believed to be just than would users of A-substage
reasoning (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983).

The main

distinction in thought between Level A and Level B
individuals is that while both are equally aware of the
rules of the social or moral order, Level B persons apply
the rules less egocentrically, with greater fairness and
social perspective.

For example, when making a moral

decision, a person at stage 4A decides in terms of "What
does the system demand?"

At stage 4B the individual would

ask "What does the system demand and what does the
individual in that system require?"

The 4B person would

seek a solution that strikes a balance between the two.
The Moral Judgment Interview
Kohlberg's assessment procedure (the Moral Judgment
Interview, MJI) is a structured projective test consisting
of hypothetical moral dilemmas (Colby, et al., 1983).
After an interviewer presents a subject with a dilemma, the
person makes a judgment about the situation and then
justifies his choice.

The interviewer probes with

questions to encourage the subject to respond freely and
elaborate on his comments.
by the interviewer.

All the responses are recorded

Since the questions that the
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interviewer asks vary according to the subject's original
judgment, subjects do not receive the same questions.
Because of the probing, the interview is quite time
consuming.

Scoring of the MJI is based on the reasoning

which the subject gives in support of his judgment.

The

scoring is conducted according to certain guides outlined
in the scoring manual. The scorer must have extensive
training in order to correctly score the protocols.
Kohlberg (1958) first developed his assessment procedure in
his dissertation.

Since then successive scoring systems

have been published.

Colby et al. (1983) have produced the

current form of the scoring method for the MJI which is
designed to be more specific in both content and structure
in scoring of protocols.

Chapter III
The Defining Issues Test
The Defining Issues Test (DIT) is an objective measure
of moral reasoning on general social problems.

Developed

by James Rest (1979), the DIT is designed to be consistent
with Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development.

Because

it uses a multiple choice reporting format, the DIT also
avoids the potential problem of confounding moral reasoning
with the ability to articulate one's thinking (Nichols &
Day, 1982).
The DIT presents six hypothetical moral dilemmas and
asks the respondent to choose from three courses of action
what he or she would have done in the dilemma.

In each

moral dilemma, the needs of two or more individuals are in
conflict.

For example, one of the six stories is the

"Heinz and the drug" dilemma which was originally one of
Kohlberg's dilemmas found in the MJI.

This story says that

Heinz's wife is near death from a special kind of cancer
and there is only one drug that might save her but Heinz
can not get enough money to buy the drug.

Finally, Heinz

gets desperate and begins to think about breaking into the
druggist's shop to steal the drug for his wife.

On the

test, the respondent is first asked to choose whether Heinz
should steal the drug or not.

The respondent is then given

a list of twelve issues that may have influenced his/her
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choice and asked to rate each as to how important it was in
resolving the moral dilemma using a five-point Likert-type
rating scale.

These twelve statements represent Kohlberg's

six stages of moral development.

As an example, "Whether a

community's laws are going to be upheld" represents a stage
4 response.

Another example, "Isn't it only natural for a

loving husband to care so much for his wife that he'd
steal?" represents a stage 3 response.

Finally, the

respondent rank-orders the four issues which he/she
believes are the most important.

Participants can respond

to all six of the moral dilemmas or to only three dilemmas
if the researcher uses the shorter version of the DIT.
The test produces a continuous number, the "P" score,
which represents the relative importance a respondent gives
to principled moral considerations, that is, to stages 5
and 6 issues (Rest, 1979).

The P-score has been the most

widely used index from Rest's test (Emler, Renwick, &
Bernadette, 1983).

It is important to note that the

individual's choice among the three courses of action on a
dilemma does not affect the P-score (Nichols & Day, 1982).
The DIT also produces the "M" score.

M items are

written to sound lofty and pretentious but not to mean
anything.

For example, an M item from the Heinz dilemma

reads, "Whether the essence of living is more encompassing
than the termination of dying, socially and individually."
These "M" items do not represent any stage of thinking but
rather probe for a respondent's tendency to endorse
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statements for their "sound" rather than their meaning.

If

respondents consistently rate and rank the M items high,
then it is uncertain that the respondent has the proper
test taking set, and the protocal must be discarded. In
this way the m score serves as a check on the adequacy of
each respondent's mode of responding.
Another score that can be produced by the DIT is the
D-index, an empirically weighted sum of rankings given to
the first four items.

Since the D-index is rarely used and

not relevant to the present project, a description of it
will not be given here but can be found in Rest (1979).
To obtain the DIT P-score, only the first four
rankings from each story are considered.

After finding the

item's stage, the choices are weighed by giving a weight of
4 to the first rank ("most important"), 3 to the second
rank ("second most important"), 2 to the third rank, and 1
to the fourth rank.

Points are then totaled across the six

stories (e.g., for stage 2, the numbers are added across
the Heinz story, Student story, Prisoner story, etc.).
There are 60 points in all, and (for the convenience of
having scores in percentages) the total number of points at
each stage is divided by .6 to yield the percentage score
of all responses at each stage (Rest, 1979).
also for stages 3, 4, 5A, 5B, 6, and M.

This is done

To get the raw

principled morality score ("P"), the points from stages 5A,
5B, and 6 are added together.

The P-score percentage is

calculated by dividing this sum by .6.

The stage with the
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highest percentage score is considered the individual's
predominant stage of moral reasoning.
No individual can score 100% on any one stage, due to
the nature of the scoring system.

For each dilemma, the

subject must choose the four most important issues.
However, there are not four issues of the same stage for
any one dilemma.

Thus, the respondent must choose issues

from at least two different stages as the four most
important issues on each story.

Chapter IV
Reliability and Validity of the DIT
Since the DIT is one of few objectively scored tests
in the domain of cognitive-development theory of morals, it
The DIT is

is now widely used (Loevinger & Knoll, 1983).

supported by studies showing high reliability, with
test-retest coeffeicents in the high .70s to low .80s (Rest
et al. 1978).

Martin, Shafto, and Vandeinse (1977) found a

partial Beta between P-scores and age to be .47.

That is,

scale scores on the DIT increased significantly as a
function of age group (junior high, high school, and
college students) and they increased in a manner which was
consistent with the stage theory of moral reasoning.
College students scored significantly higher than younger
subjects on scale scores from each principled reasoning
stage.

Martin et al. also estimated the reliability of the

P-score using the method of Kristof (1974).

This method

requires that the test be divided into thirds.

There were

15 different ways to divide the DIT in thirds by combining
partial P-scores from pairs of dilemmas.

The median

estimated reliability over these 15 splits was .70.

The

authors concluded that the DIT has a substantial advantage
over the Moral Judgment Scale (Kohlberg's method of
assessment which involves a structured interview) because
it is an objective and quick measure of moral development.
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Davison and Robbins (1978) found the overall indices of
reliability for the DIT based on six stories to generally
have internal consistency and test-retest reliabilities in
the high .70's and low .80's.

A longitudinal study by Rest

(1975) demonstrated the stability of the DIT over two years
for two different groups, r = .54 and r = .68.
The literature indicates that the DIT has substantial
validity and predictive utility as well.

It has been shown

that people who score high and low on the DIT differ in
religious motivation, compliance, cheating, volunteering,
discipline style, concept of other people, delinquency, and
values.
Sapp and Jones (1986) found that principled moral
reasoning was significantly related to religion-as-quest,
r = .49.

A person high on religion-as-quest is

characterized by a faith that has been formed through a
process of doubt, investigation, readiness to be selfcritical toward one's own beliefs, and an open-minded
seeking of religious truth.
Froming and Cooper (1977) found compliance (reporting
number of metronome clicks heard over headphones after
confederates unanimously responded first) to be negatively
correlated to level of moral judgment, r = -.31, p < .05.
In a similar study, Froming (1978) found that subjects in
moral judgment stages 3 and 4 complied significantly more
than stage 5 subjects in a situation in which their
personal count of a series of metronome clicks was
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contradicted by a unanimous group.
Malinowski and Smith (1985) found that the lower the
moral judgment score, (as measured by the DIT), the more
likely a subject was to cheat on academic tests and the
sooner he began to cheat.

P-scores were correlated,

r = -.48, p < .001, with the number of trials on which
subjects cheated.

Also, P-scores were positively

correlated with how long subjects waited to begin cheating
r = .43, p < .001.

Interestingly, of 12 people who did not

cheat, 11 were classified as high in moral judgment.
However, Malinowski and Smith failed to control for
intelligence or academic competence.
should be interpreted with caution.

Thus, these results
Dunivant (1975), in an

unpublished doctorial dissertation, also reported the
P-score to be effective for predicting resistance to
cheating.
Kohlberg's stages 5A and 5B (as measured by the DIT)
powerfully predicted volunteering to help with a charity
drive (actually attending an envelope-stuffing session).
Kohlberg's stages 5A and 5B entered the regression equation
(with no other variables and both with positive weights)
yielding a multiple R of R = .80, p < .001 (Tsujimoto &
Emmons, 1983).

Erkut, Jaquette, and Staub (1981) found

that stage 5 subjects (as measured by the DIT) were
significantly more likely to help an "ailing" person who
needed help than stage 3 and 4 subjects, t(13) = 3.8516,
p = .0008.
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Olejnik (1980) found that adults' induction as a
method of reasoning with children was the preferred
discipline style of principled-level individuals, while
power assertion was preferred by individuals at lower
levels of moral development.

In another study on

discipline and moral development, Bloom (1978) found
persons preferring principled reasons for resolving moral
dilemmas to have a more democratic-humanistic attitude
toward discipline than their less principled reasoning
peers.
Whiteman, Zucker, and Grimley (1978) showed a
consistent relationship between students' level of moral
development on the DlT and their positive attitudes about
other people.

A one-way analysis of variance showed that

those students who had reached the higher (principled)
stages of moral development felt more positively about
other people than students at lower stages of moral
development.

P-scores correlated with positive attitudes

towards other people, r = .25, p = .001.
In a study comparing delinquent boys with a comparison
group of nondelinquent boys, the DIP revealed significant
differences between the groups.

The subjects were matched

on age, IQ, SES, race, sex, same neighborhood, same school,
one-parent vs. two-parent homes, and grades in school.

The

antisocial predelinquent group's mean P-index on the DIT
was 16.9, considerably below that of the matched comparison
group mean of 23.7, t(25) = 3.58, p < .001 (McColgan, Rest,

1.7
& Pruitt, 1983 1.
In a study relating values with moral judgment, Wilson
(1983) found that subjects at the post-conventional level
of moral judgment ranked significantly higher on the
Rokeach Value Survey the values Freedom, Intellectual,
Capable and Honest than did subjects at the other levels of
moral maturity.

Interestingly, they also ranked lower than

others the values Pleasure, Salvation, Clean and Polite.
Moral development as measured by the DIT has also been
studied in relation to personality.

For example, Wahram

(1981) found that greater dogmatism was associated with
lower levels of moral judgment development.

In another

study, Polovy (1980) correlated students' P-scores with
their scores on the California Personality Inventory (CPI).
Subjects who preferred principled levels of moral reasoning
were found to be more dependable, rational, creative,
intelligent, and accepting of the rules and constraints of
society, but at the same time, able to think independently
and aware of the need for change than lower stage
reasoners.

See Rich (1983) for an extensive review of the

literature associating moral development with personality
variables.
Intelligence and moral thinking are so highly
correlated that some have questioned whether high
intelligence ensures high moral reasoning (Lickona, 1976).
Studies have shown, however, that intelligence is a
necessary, but not sufficient condition for moral
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reasoning.

For example, Kuhn, Langer, & Kohlberg (1976)

found all adolescents and adults who scored at stages 5 or
6 to be capable of formal reasoning on Piaget's pendulum
and correlation problems, but many persons who were
formal-operational on these logical problems failed to show
any moral reasoning at the highest, postconventional
stages.

It seems, then, that the research appears to show

that being smart and being moral are not the same.
Cognitive power may be needed for principled moral thought,
but it is not enough (Lickona, 1976).
Studies on the DIT have been criticized by Kay (1982)
to be so confounded with age and education that they lack
discriminant validity from these characteristics.

In fact,

Kay claims the literature suggests that perhaps all the
variance attributable to the age-education confound derives
from education.

However, a number of studies have found

predictive validity for the DIT even in samples which are
homogeneous on age and education.

In the Tsujimoto and

Emmons (1983) study mentioned earlier, volunteering
behavior was powerfully predicted among subjects who were
all introductory psychology students.

It can be safely

assumed that these students were very similar in both age
and education.

In other words, among subjects who were

basically the same in age and education, the DIT
discriminated among the different levels of moral reasoning
quite well.
Coder (1975) collected demographic data, measures of
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moral judgment, moral comprehension, intelligence, law and
order orientation and liberalism on 87 adults from ages 25
to 55.

Critical comparisons showed that age did not

correlate with the DIT, thus ruling age out as an index of
moral development in adulthood.
Among 47 twelfth grade students, Rest (1973)
classified eight students as stage 6, nine as stage 5,
sixteen as stage 4, eleven as stage 3 and three as stage 2
using Kohlberg's moral judment interview.
Zeidler (1985) correlated scores from the Test of
Logical Thinking (TOLT) with scores from the DIT using 99
randomly selected tenth grade biology students.

The TOLT

consists of 10 items which measure five different modes of
formal reasoning ability: proportional reasoning,
controlling variables, probabilistic reasoning,
correlational reasoning and combinatorial reasoning.

All

five of the formal reasoning variables were significantly
correlated to postconventional moral reasoning with Pearson
Correlation Coefficients ranging from .20 to .40.

The sum

of the five formal reasoning variables was significantly
correlated with the DIT r = .43, p = 0.0001, using this
sample which was similar both in age and education.
Olejnik (1980) found clear differentiation among 50
young adults of similar education (college students between
18 and 21 years of age) in the preferred discipline style
of principled -level individuals.
McColgan, Rest, and Pruitt (1983) matched 26 anti-
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social predelinquent boys with 26 nondelinquent comparison
subjects.

The pairs were similar on age, SES, and IQ.

The

fact that the DIT revealed significant differences between
the groups in moral reasoning indicates that the DIT does
measure something other than age and education.
Although Kay (1982) has reasonable criticism that ago
ind

Alcation confound many studies using the DIT, the

studies mentioned here indicate that the DIT does indeed
have discriminant validity after age and education have
been controlled.

In other words, there is still

considerable variance which age and education alone cannot
explain, and this variance is correlated with relevant
moral behavior, attitudes, and cognitive abilities.

Chapter V
Behavioral Implications of Separating 5s and 6s
Most studies using the DIT depend on the P-score to
differentiate the higher morally developed (stages 5 & 6)
from the lower stages.

Little work has been done in

discriminating among either the higher or lower stages.
Researchers have not used stage 6 as an independent or
dependent variable.

Rather, they have used the P-score, a

combination of stage 5 and stage 6 reasoning.

In fact, the

DIT is not usually scored for stage 6 (Rich, 1983), perhaps
because stage 6s are either rare or difficult to find
(Froming & Cooper, 1977).

Also, this author has been

unable to find real evidence for the discriminative
validity between stages 5 and 6 or any direct tests for
such validity.
Because of this difficulty with differentiating stage
6, most literature on the high levels of moral reasoning
focuses on the "post-conventional" stages.

Such a focus

allows for consideration of so-called "high stage"
reasoners while not demanding the tedious and difficult
task of separating the 5s and 6s into their respective
stages.
For several reasons, researchers have wandered away
from showing that stages 5 and 6 are distinct.

Firstly,

while the theory of a sixth stage of moral development
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makes conceptual sense, practically it has been difficult
to find such people.

Secondly, the fact that the DIT

provides for a measure of determining highly "principled"
moral thinkers instead of clearly distinguishing stage 6s
indicates either a lack of ability or commitment to find
these stage 6 people or a serious, but covert doubt by
these researchers that such a stage pragmatically exists.
Indeed, Kohlberg's latest manual for scoring his moral
reasoning protocols drops stage 6 (Loevinger & Knoll,
1983).

Finally, perhaps because of the first two reasons,

researchers have shifted their interests to applying
Kohlberg's theory and the DIT to practical problems such as
antisocial behavior (McColgan, Rest, & Pruitt, 1983) and
teaching moral education in the schools (Kohlberg & Turiel,
1971).

Differentiating stages 5 and 6 has not been

important for these practical issues since they concern
young persons and delinquents who are at lower levels of
moral reasoning.
One may wonder why the distinction of stage 6s should
be revived.

Even though the literature indicates that the

stage 6 is elusive and that such people are rare, this does
not mean that such a stage does not exist, nor that the
search for such people should be abandoned.

Indeed, the

fact that such people are so rare increases the need to
discover them and learn more about just what
characteristics set them apart from the other stages,
especially stage 5.
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There are two justifications for such a search.

The

first lies in the presumption that there are different
behavioral implications for stage 6 people than even stage
5 people.

Stage 6 offers possibilities for moral behavior

that stage 5 does not.
Milgram's (1963) obedience study is an example of how
stage 6 behavior can be clearly different from stage 5
behavior.

In the study an authority figure forces subjects

to violate the welfare of another individual for the sake
of the experiment.

They found that

"For stage 3 and 4 subjects, definition of "right" in
this situation is synonymous with the dictates of
conventional authority, hence there is likely to be
little defiance of the experimenter. Despite the
differentiation of human rights from conventional
obligations at stage 5, these subjects also continue
to punish the "learner" because of their sensitivity
to a contractual agreement to work on the experiment.
Only those capable of stage 6 reasoning, where human
rights are differentiated from contractual agreement,
can integrate the two claims into a hierarchy in which
human rights have a clear priority. Because they are
able to conceive of human rights as having precedence
over contractual agreements, stage 6 subjects refuse
to follow the orders of the experimenter's authority.
The empirical results are consistent with this
interpretation: 75% of stage 6 subjects defied
experimenter's orders, while only 13% of those in
lower stages were able to do so" (Erkut et al. 1981,
p.3).
In this study no differences were found among people at
stages 2, 3, 4, and 5.

But these stages as a group

differed from stage 6.

The results of this study indicate

that there can be a major difference between the behavior
of a stage 5 person and that of a stage 6 person
particularly with regard to the well being of other human
beings.
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In a study of moral

judgments and their relation to

attitudes about capital punishment, Kohlberg and Elfenbein
(1975) found clear distinctions among the stages of moral
development.

The authors found that on the whole, the

progression through the universal, invariant sequence of
moral stages is accompanied by a radical decline in support
for capital punishment.

This decline occurs largely

because, as individuals develop more mature conceptions of
justice, they systematically narrow the range of
considerations which can justify taking the lives of
criminals.

At stage 3 and below, almost all the subjects

accepted the death penalty; stage 4 subjects were divided
on the issue; all the stage 5 subjects rejected capital
punishment.

There were no stage 6 subjects in this study.

The authors were able to show that although all of the
stage 5 subjects of this study rejected capital punishment,
stage 5 thinking does not necessarily lead one to oppose
capital punishment when the assumption is made that it does
deter potential murderers.

For example, when asked the

question, "Is it the same thing for a state to demand a
life as it is for you or me to demand a life?", a stage 5
person replied,
"I think it is very similar. I think I could see the
existence of the death penalty if it would serve as a
real deterrent to some type of crime that would
involve life and death. But I don't think anyone has
come up with anything that can really prove that it
serves as a deterrent." (Kohlberg & Elfenbein, 1975,
p. 628)
Beyond stage 5, there is a higher stage of thinking, stage
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6, which orients to

illiversal moral principles and respect

for individual persons.

Because it is higher, stage 6 can

resolve the contradictions in attitudes toward capital
punishment still found at stage 5.

The authors believe

that by applying stage 6 principles to the problem of
punishment, a theory of punitive justice based on
equilibrated (original position) role-taking coul
developed.

be

Stage 6 thinking, which provides, in essence,

that the justice of penal systems is to be judged from a
completely impartial point of view, mandates the abolition
of the death penalty on the grounds that it is unjust.
Thus while stage 5 people may sometimes accept the death
penalty, stage 6 people would never accept it.

Again, the

implication is that there is a marked distinction between
the expected behavior of stage 5 and 6 people.
The differentiation between expected behaviors of
stage 6 from stage 5 people was again illustrated by
Kohlberg (1973) using the Heinz dilemma described earlier.
Kohlberg showed that subjects classified as stage 5
recognized the woman's right to live and the duty of Heinz
to steal for his wife, based on contract, even though they
might have to go to jail for it.

However, the stage 5

subjects recognized no duty to steal for a friend or
stranger in the same predicament who equally had a right to
life.

On the other hand, a stage 6 person not only would

steal for his wife, but also for the friend or stranger
because "the value of a human life remains the same."

The
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behavioral implication is that the stage 6 person has to he
prepared to go to jail to steal for a friend or
acquaintance, but the stage 5 person does not.

In other

words, the stage 6 person recognizes a compelling duty to
act on his/her higher personal principles.

There is a

"correlative duty" at the sixth stage which is not found at
the fifth.

Kohlberg's claim from this paper is that a

higher or later stage of moral judgment is objectively
preferable to or more adequate than an earlier stage of
judgment.
As Kohlberg's theory suggests, the studies on capital
punishment and obedience in the Milgram situation show that
there is not only a more comprehensive moral philosophy
with the stage 6 person, but also a greater consistency
with that moral philoshophy.

The quote on capital

punishment by the stage 5 subject shows that even at this
high stage of moral development, the stage 5 reasoner can
behave differently in the same situation depending on which
issue he considers.

This stage 5 person first said that he

thought it is very similar for a state to take a life as it
is for an individual to take a life.

But then he goes on

to say that if the death penalty deters life and death
crimes then it is alright.

However, the stage 6 person has

no trouble in being consistent because his principles are
more comprehensive.

Capital punishment is unjust

regardless of deterring effects because of a solid
underlying principle which orients to universal moral

principles and respect for individual persons.
Only stage 6 has an articulated logic that justifies
going against the law when it is against one's principles.
As Kohlberg (1981) put it, stage 6 "assumes guidance by
universal ethical principles that all humanity should
follow.
1

Regarding what is right, Stage 6 is guided by
universal ethical principles. Particular laws or
social agreements are usually valid because they
rest on such principles. When laws violate these
principles, one acts in accordance with the
principle. Principles are universal principles of
justice: the equality of human rights and respect
for the dignity of human beings as individuals.
These are not merely values that are recognized,
but are also principles used to generate particular
decisions.

2. The reason for doing right is that, as a rational
person, one has seen the validity of principles and
and has become committed to them." (p. 412).
Such guidance by universal ethical principles can explain
behaviors referred to as civil disobedience.

For example,

some people who refused to go to Vietnam and fight were
appealing to such a set of universal principles in their
own minds although much of society perceived them as simply
breaking the law by refusing to obey the government.
A second justification for the present project can be
found in the writings of Abraham Maslow and M.A. Howe.
Maslow (1971) proposed for research the use of superior
specimens as biological assays for studying the best
capability that the human species has.

In other words, if

we want to know of what human beings are capable we should
look to this small and selected superior group rather than
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to the whole of the population.

As Maslow put it

"If we want to answer the question how tall can the
human species grow, then obviously it is well to pick
out the ones who are already tallest and study them.
If we want to know how fast a human being can run,
then it is no use to average out the speed of a 'good
sample' of the population; it is far better to collect
Olympic gold medal winners and see how well they can
do. If we want to know the possibilities for
spiritual growth, value growth, or moral development
in human beings, then I maintain that we can learn
most by studying our most moral, ethical, or saintly
people." (Maslow, 1971, p. 7)
It would be to society's benefit to know what
characteristics the highest moral reasoners have in common
and how they were developed.

But to gain a better

understanding of the highest moral reasoners, we first must
be able to determine who they are.
Similarily, Howe (1982) stated that we have not
improved our ability to predict intellectual excellence in
individual cases.

Even though the precise causes of

individual excellence may be unique to each person, if we
are to extend our knowledge, then it is beneficial to try
to gain a fuller understanding of the causes of outstanding
intellectual achievements.

Howe further proposed that by

intensely examining the lives of intellectually superior
persons, insights may be gained about individual growth and
development which might otherwise fail to emerge.
For the present paper, the benefit of clearly
differentiating stage 6 reasoners can be in helping to
easily identify this small portion of the population apart
so that they can be studied.

However, the previous review

of the literature has shown that researchers have not been
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very successful in showing who are clearly stage 6 moral
reasoners.

New items designed to provide such a marked

distinction could significantly help the quest for
understanding the highest moral reasoners in our culture.
In summary, both the theoretical and empirical
literature indicates that there are different behavioral
implications for each of Kohlberg's stages of moral
development.

It also indicates that the DIT is generally a

valid and reliable measure of the stages and has been shown
to have predictive utility.

Although it has been shown to

be a good measure, the present literature review indicates
that the DIT's ability to differentiate between 5's and 6's
is uncertain.

Since it would be beneficial to better

differentiate between these two stages more clearly, the
purpose of this paper is to develop additional stage 6
items to be added to the DIT which can achieve this
discrimination.

Chapter VI
Method
New items for the DIT were developed by the author and
the chair of this thesis.

The criterion for the

development of new items was that the new items had to be
consistent with the definition of stage 6 found in Table 1.
Specifically, the items had to show (implicitly or
explicitly) the following three criteria:
1)

The choice is made by reference to a clear hierarchy of

abstract principles such as justice, reciprocity, equality
of human rights, and respect for the dignity of human
beings as individual persons.
2)

Each item had to show a "corresponding duty" to act in

harmony with these abstract principles for "only at stage 6
are rights and duties completely correlative" (Kohlberg,
1973).
3)

The items had to show full role-reversibility.

That

is, that the decision is made on the basis of justice as
considered by all parties in the story and as seen by a
neutral third party.
These three criteria were chosen because Kohlberg has shown
them to be three principle elements that differentiate
stages 5 & 6 (Kohlberg, 1973).

Secondly, these same three

elements seem to be largely missing from the principled
items on the DIT.
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After the new items were written, they were reviewed
by other psychologists familiar with Kohlberg's theory.
Revisions were made based on comments and suggestions about
the new items.

The new items were added to the DIT so that

each story had a total of two stage 6 items.

The new

version of the DIT was then administered to people who were
considered likely stage 6 reasoners.
Criteria For Successful Scale Development
To help insure that the new items were accepted as
clearly distinguishing stage 6 people from the other
stages, certain criteria were developed:
I)

There should be internal consistency within each story
and across stories.
Individuals who choose one stage 6 item should

predominantly choose the other stage 6 item from the same
story.
As described earlier, the top four issues are rankordered according to importance and given 4, 3, 2, and 1
points, respectively.

Hypothetically, the perfect stage 6

person should rank-order one stage 6 item as most important
(4 points); and the other stage 6 item for that same story
should be selected second (3 points).

In other words, for

each story, the two stage 6 items snould be selected higher
(more important) than any of the other items by the perfect
stage 6 person.

Theoretically, it would be possible for

the perfect stage 6 person to get a total of 42 points on
stage 6 across the six stories ((4 + 3) x 6 = 42).

But
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since it is unlikely that perfect stage 6 people exist or
that 12 perfectly unambiguous stage 6 items could be
written, we arbitrarily set a cutoff of 30 points.

Thus,

if a person received 30 or more points on stage 6, s/he was
considered a stage 6 moral reasoner.

The probability of

someone who is not stage 6 in moral reasoning receiving at
least 30 points on the stage 6 level is extraordinarily
low.
The computation of the likelihood of scoring 30 or
more points on stage 6 with random responding was
calculated as follows: On each of the six stories, there
are 182 random combinations in which the 14 items can be
chosen for the first four choices.

The likelihood that

zero through seven stage 6 points would be received on each
story through random responding is given below:
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

points
point
points
points
points
points
points
points

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

90/182
20/182
20/182
22/182
22/182
4/182
2/182
2/182

A basic program was written to compute the probability
of each possible combination of points from the six
stories.

For example, the probability of getting

5,5,5,5,5,5 points on the six stories is simply (4/182)6.
The program also computed the total number of combinations
of points on the six stories which would result in 30 or
more stage 6 points (17,304).

The sum of these 17,304

individual probabilities which represents an individual's
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likelihood of scoring 30 or more by random responding is
still only p < .000009.

Thus, only 9 times out of one

million would a person responding randomly score 30 points
or more on stage 6 items. 1

It is highly unlikely that

someone who is not predominantly a stage 6 reasoner (and
who ranks the items completely at random) will consistently
rank-order stage 6 items across the six stories in the
first and second most important slots (assuming that the
items are true stage 6 items).

Thus, a cutoff of 30 points

is a very stringent criterion and would reflect very high
internal consistency in selecting stage 6 items.
II)

5A and 53 items should be chosen next by stage 6
reasoners
Subjects who predominantly choose stage 6 items should

select a predominance of other P items next (i.e., 5A & 5B
items).

Kohlberg's theory states that there is an

invariant progression upward through the stages with 6 as
the highest stage.

Thus, the consistent response would be

for the stage 6 person to choose items that are closest to
his/her way of thinking (i.e., stage 5 items).
To determine that 5A and 5B items are chosen next by
stage 6 reasoners, the proportion of remaining points
allotted to stages 5, 4, and 3 was determined.

The number

of points allotted to stage 6 were subtracted from 60.

The

difference was then divided into the points assigned to
stages 5, 4, and 3, respectively.

For example, if a

participant scored 32 points on stage 6, 14 points on stag'-
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5, 7 points on stage 4, and 5 points on stage 3, of the
remaining possible points (60 - 32 = 28), this person would
have allotted 50% to stage 5, 25% to stage 4, and 18% to
stage 3.
III)

Non-stage 6 persons should select stage 6 items only
by chance.
If the new stage 6 items are truly stage 6, they

should appeal only to stage 6 thinkers. Non-stage 6
students should not list the stage 6 items among the four
most important items at more than a chance level since most
undergraduates are at stage 3 or 4 in moral reasoning.
Kohlberg's theory, and research on that theory (Rest,
Turiel, & Kohlberg, 1969) have indicated that persons at
the lower stages of moral development typically do not
understand or endorse statements which represent higher
stages of moral reasoning.
Selection of New Stage 6 Items
The first set of new items developed for the DIT are
listed in Table 2.

The DIT (with the new items) was

administered to 36 introductory psychology students from
Western Kentucky University as a pilot test.

Any new stage

6 items chosen above a chance level were rejected.

By

chance alone, each item had a 4 in 14 or 28% chance of
being chosen among the top four items.

The standard error

of these choices is given by the formula, SEM=,./npq.

For

example, with 36 respondents, an item would be chosen on
average (.28)(36) = 10.08 times, with a standard error of
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2.71.

Using a one-tailed test, the probability that an

item would be chosen by 9 or more respondents by chance
alone is less than 50%.

We rejected all items that were

selected by more than 10 people or 28% of the respondents.
First Pilot Test
The results of the first pilot test showed that
several of the new items were chosen at random levels, but
others were chosen quite frequently by the undergraduates
(see Table 2).

Even though the items were developed

according to the criteria outlined earlier, these latter
items still appealed to the undergraduate population.

For

example, the new stage 6 item for the Heinz story (#11) was
chosen by 27 out of 36 students or by 75% of the
respondents.

Such a high percentage is clearly not

acceptable as an item for discriminating stage 6 reasoning.
New items that passed the first pilot test were
#10 of the Student story,
#5

and #13 of Escaped Prisoner,

#14 of Webster,
New items which were rejected were:
#11 of Heinz story,
#8

of Doctor's Dilemma,

#11 of Webster,
#8

and #14 of Newspaper.

Table 2
First set of new stage 6 items for 7,I1 and percentage of students who selected
each item as first, second, third, and fourth most important (6)
1st

2nd

Total

22

22

11

19

75

3

6

3

11

6

11

6

28

3

11

6

19

11

28

.'2,1AJj

7einz and the Drug
11. Does one person's right to live create an obligation
for others to break the law if necessary to save that
life?
.9. What values are going to be the basis for governing
how people act towards each other?
Student Take-ever
10. In what situation should a person disrupt an
institution to insure jhistice?

e

*8. Is taking over a building consistent with principles
of justice?

0

Escaped Prisoner
5. If the law won't treat !'r. Thompson justly, how should
one act to insure justice in this situation?
13. From whose perspective should 72.-s
what is just?

cones decide

11

3

19

61

-octor's Dilemma
8. What would the doctor's responsibility be after he
wefgned the value of human life with the patient's
right to decide?
*10. Is helping to end another's life ever a responsible
act of cooperation?
From Pest's original test

0

17

25

able 2

:e(

.21:141

LSI

25

39

ibtal

or

11. Is adhering to the principle of justice more important
than following the wishes of the customers?

1,

6

14. Does a society's responsibility to its minorities
create a duty for :"r. Webster?

0

3

3

3

8

0

3

0

3

6

11

19

11

17

58

17

35

*
•

:ihat individual differences ought to be relevant
in deciding how society's roles are filled?

::ewspaper
•

What is the principal's responsibility after
weighing the parents' concerns, the need for an
orderly school, and the students' right of free
speech?

14. Does justice require the principal to allow the
paper even if parents disapprove and it might cause
disorder at school?
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The implication of the first oilot test is that some
characteristics of some of the new items made them
attractive to the lower stage thinkers even though they
were developed according to the stage 6 criteria given
earlier.

A continued search was needed for new stage 6

discriminators.
Interestingly, the frequencies for the original stage
6 items were quite low compared to the new items, an
indication that there was something present in the original
items that the new items did not have.

Upon closer

examination, it was evident that the original stage 6 items
were more abstract than the new items (i.e., more removed
from the specifics of the immediate dilemma).

For example,

the original stage 6 item for the Heinz story (#9) reads,
"What values are going to be the basis for governing how
people act towards each other?"

On the other hand, the

pilot test's stage 6 item for the same story (#11) reads,
"Does one person's right to live create an obligation for
others to break the law if necessary to save that life?"
The new stage 6 item is more specific to the concept of the
story than the original item in that it mentions the "right
to life" issue and the issue of breaking the law.

Perhaps

this specificity made the new items more attractive to the
students.
Second Pilot Test
A second group of items was developed according to the
same three criteria used for the first group of items, but

which was more abstract than the first group.

This test

was administered to 30 undergraduate students.
As Table 3 shows, the second new item for the Heinz
story (#11) fared much better with only 20% selecting it as
compared with 75% in the first pilot test.

There were no

significant reductions in frequencies among the other items
that were chosen too frequently in the first pilot test.
Following are new items that passed the second pilot test:
#11 of the Heinz story,
#13 of Escaped Prisoner.
In addition, #8

of Doctor's Dilemma still was accepted

since none of the 30 students selected this issue as either
their first or second choice.
Numbers 8 and 14 of the Newspaper story were both too
popular with 43% and 40% of the subjects choosing them,
respectively.

Both items were rejected.

Third Pilot Test
From the first two pilot tests stage 6 items which
were considered acceptable for the revised DIT were found
for all dilemmas except the Newspaper story.

Due to the

high percentages of students who selected the stage 6 items
for the Newspaper dilemma in both pilot tests, a third
pilot test was conducted with only the Newspaper dilemma.
Two new stage 6 items were developed for the Newspaper
dilemma and then administered to 33 undergraduate
introductory psychology students at Western Kentucky
University.

These two new items and the percentages of

:able /.)
2econa set of new stage 6 items for ALT and percentage of students who selected
each item as first, second, third, and fourth most important
1st

2nd

.asi

Total

:;einz and the :rug
11, What duties are created by another person's rights?

3

10

4

20

*9. What values are going to be the basis for governing
how people act towards each other?

10

0

13

23

7

7

3tudent Take ever
10. In what situation should a person disrupt an institution
to insure justice? (Same as first set)
*

ci•

Is taking over a building consistent with principles
of lustice?

17

0

10

10

0

10

30

10

27

23

37

Escaped Prisoner
From what perspective should one decide what justice
requires?
13, How should one act to insure justice in an unjust
situation?

7

13

7

7

Doctor's Dilemma
fly what principles should one decide what to do in
this situation?
*10, is helping to end another's life ever a responsible
act of cooperation?
* From Pest's original test

13

7

13

(0oht.)

:able
1st

Ll.LL

2r.,,,;

:otal

Webster
14. What duties does a society's responsibility to its
minorities create for individuals?

*5. What individual differences ought to be relevant

0

in deciding how society's roles are filled?
1:ewspaper
8. Xould cancelling the paper violate the student's
basic rights?
14. Whether justice sometimes requires defending unpopular
acts.

'

23

10

7

43

7

7

140

:able
fhird set of nev. stage 6 items for :.ewspaper story and percentage of students who
selected each item as first, second, thira, and fourth most important (N=33)
1st

2nd

Is one obligated to defend the right of free speech
of someone who is going to abuse that right?

12

3

3

12

30

What does justice obligate one to dc in this case?

15

15

5

6

39

th

Total

newspaper
k„.
14,

43
students who selected them are given in Table 4.
Number 8 was chosen by 30% of the subjects which was
the lowest percentage for this item of the three pilot
tests.

Thus, this item was added to the final version of

the revised DIT.
subjects.

Number 14 was chosen by 39% of the

The lowest percentage for this item of the three

pilot tests was given in the first pilot test (33%).

Thus

the item used for #14 in the first pilot test was used in
the revised DIT.
The set of stage 6 items chosen from the three pilot
tests to be used in the final version of the DIT are listed
in Table 5 and the final version of the DIT is given in
Appendix A.
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Table 5
The Final Set of Stage 6 Items

Heinz
9.

What values are going to be the basis for governing
how people act towards each other? (Original item)

11.

What duties are created by another person's rights?
(2nd pilot test)

Student
8.

Is taking over a building consistent with principles
of justice? (Original item)

10.

In what situation should a person disrupt an
institution to insure justice? (Same in 1st
& 2nd pilot tests)

Escaped Prisoner
5.

If the law won't treat Mr. Thompson justly, how
should one act to insure justice in this situation?
(1st pilot test)

13.

How should one act to insure justice in an unjust
situation? (2nd pilot test)

Doctor's Dilemma
8.

By what principles should one decide what to do in
this situation? (2nd pilot test)

10.

Is helping to end another's life ever a responsible
act of cooperation? (Original item)
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(Cont.)

Table 5

Webster
5.

What individual differences ought to be relevant in
deciding how society's roles are filled? ;Original
item)

14.

What duties does a society's responsibility to its
minorities create for individuals? (2nd pilot test)

Newspaper
8.

Is one obligated to defend the right of free speech
of someone who is going to abuse that right? (3rd
pilot test)

14.

Does justice require the principal to allow the paper
even if parents disapprove and it might cause disorder at school? (1st pilot test)
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Administration of the Revised DT
The next step of this study was to administer the
revised DIT to possible stage 6 reasoners to determine if
such reasoners consider the new stage 6 items to be stage
6.
Search Procedure
We expected that stage 6 individuals would be hard to
find since, according to Kohlberg's theory, they are rare.
However, a judicious procedure was used to select likely
stage 6 respondents.

We looked in populations where logic

indicated stage 6 persons were likely to be found.

We

looked specifically in the following groups:
1)

Individuals who study and/or teach moral philosophy.
The assumption was that a high percentage of stage 6
persons should be among this group whose occupations
center around the study and research of moral
reasoning.

2)

Individuals whose life styles indicate a commitment
to "stage 6" principled moral issues.

This includes

those who actively advocate and participate in
humanitarian and global causes.

People who are

committed to such causes are not necessarily stage
6 reasoners.

However, this is considered a valid

starting point in the search for stage 6 thinkers
because such commitments and activities are implied
in the definition of stage 6.
3)

Religious leaders who appear to have developed
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universalisti.:7 applications of their religious/
moral beliefs; applications which actively
address human needs and which promote justice,
regardless of religious or social conventions.
4)

It was likely that many people we selected to be stlae
6 would turn out to be stage 5.

Since in Kohlberg's

theory a person can recognize one stage above oneself,
we used stage 5 individuals to refer us to people who
they thought might be stage 6 reasnners.

That is, we

asked those who scored the most points on stage 6 but
who did not Jiake the cutoff of 30 to recommend others.

Chapter VII
Results
Using the preceding criteria in Chapter VI, the
revised DIT was given to 35 individuals.
returned.

Thirty (86%) were

Of the 30 DITs completed for this project, three

individals met the cutoff of 30 points on stage 6 (see
Table 6).

Of these three, one person scored 33 points on

stage 6 while the other two participants scored exactly 30.
Since the odds by chance were only 9 in a million, it seems
fair to say that we found at least 3 persons whose moral
reasoning meets our criteria of stage 6.

One other person

scored 29 on stage 6, another scored 28, and one person
scored 26 on stage 6.

The remaining participants all

scored 24 or below on stage 6.
All three stage 6 participants gave the highest
proportion of remaining points to stage 5.

The participant

who received 33 points on stage 6 allotted 78% of the
remaining points to stage 5, 15% to stage 4 and none to
stage 3.

The first participant who scored 30 points on

stage 6 allotted 53% of the remaining points to stage 5,
30% to stage 4 and 10% to stage 3.

The second participant

who scored 30 on stage 6 allotted 53% of the remaining
points to stage 5, 17% to stage 4 and 27% to stage 3.
Clearly all three participants predominantly chose stage 5
items after stage 6 items as predicted.
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The two participants who received 29 and 28 points on
stAge 6 also assigned the highest percentage of the
remaining points to stage 5, 81% and 84% respectively (see
Table 6).

Table 7 presents the distribution of responses

for all respondents arranged in descending order according
to stage 6 responses.
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Table 6
Top Stage 6 Respondents And Percentage Of Remaining
Points Assigned To Stages 5, 4, 3, & 2

Respondent

Points at
Stage 6

Percentage of Remaining Points At:
Stage 5 Stage 4 Stage 3 Stage 2

1

33

78

15

0

7

2

30

53

30

10

7

3

30

53

17

27

0

4

29

81

16

0

3

28

84

13

3

0

26

41

59

0

0

6
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Table 7
Raw Scores And Predominant Stages

Subject

2

3

4

5A

5B

6

1.
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

2
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
0
4
0
0
1
1
0
2
1
0
0
2
2
0
8
2
2

0
3
8
0
1
0
3
5
0
0
5
3
8
7
0
3
3
3
8
2
2
1
3
18
2
3
4
5
4
13

4
9
5
5
4
20
6
5
1
22
5
7
1
11
12
4
4
23
5
13
27
19
5
5
9
23
36
18
22
14

14
13
16
18
21
9
18
9
18
12
20
20
10
18
9
18
18
4
15
17
4
16
25
12
18
11
3
16
19
12

7
3
0
7
6
5
8
11
9
1
5
6
13
3
6
8
8
9
10
5
6
4
4
8
4
5
3
1
3
13

33
30
30
29
28
26
24
24
23
23
22
22
21
21
21
21
21
20
20
20
19
19
17
17
15
14
10
8
5
4

Pdt. Stage
6
6
6
6
6
6
5
6
5
6
5
5
5
5/6
6
5
5
4
5
5
4
5
c_.,
5
5
4
4
4
4
5

52
Ten participants scored predominantly stage 6 (i.e.,
more points were assigned to stage six than to any other
stage).

Thirteen subjects predominantly scored stage 5.

Six subjects scored predominantly stage 4 and one subject
scored equally on stages 5 and 6.
Since part of the objective for this study was to
develop items that only appealed to stage 6 'ndividuals and
not stage 5 people, it was necessary to determine whether
the new items appealed to only one of the stages or to
both.

To do this we looked to see if any items were

excluded by stage 6 reasoners and by stage 5 reasoners.
Because of the small sample size, the analyses were done by
examining frequencies.
Table 8 shows that two items (Webster #5 and Newspaper
#8) were each omitted by three out of the top six stage 6
individuals.

The remaining stage 6 items were selected

consistently by all of the top six stage 6 participants.
The fact that those two were omitted by three out of six
respondents indicates that those items may not be useful
for discriminating stage 6.
Table 9 shows how the stage 6 items that were most
popular among the highest stage 6 individuals were ranked
by the predominantly stage 5 respondents.

All four items

were very popular among the stage 5 respondents.

Number 10

of Student Take-Over was ranked among the four most
important items by 12 out of 13 respondents, or 92%.
Number 13 of Escaped Prisoner was selected by 54%, number
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Table 8
Stage 6 Items Omitted By
The Highest Stage 6 Participants

Respondent

Hz

St

Prs

Dr

NP

5

1
10

5

8

3

11
9

8
8

5

5

4

6

Web

8
8

8
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Table 9
Stage 5 Respondents' Rankings Of The Stage 6
Items Which Where Selected Consistently By
The Highest Stage 6 Respondents

Respondent

St #10

EP #13

Web #14

1

2

3

2

1

2

2

0

1

1

3

1

0

2

1

4

2

2

3

1

5

4

3

2

4

6

3

1

2

3

7

1

0

1

4

8

1

0

2

0

9

1

0

3

3

10

2

3

2

3

11

0

1

3

0

12

3

3

0

0

13

3

0

0

0

NP #14
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14 of Webster by 85%, and number 14 of Newspaper by 69% of
the respondents.

It seems that these four stage 6 items

that were popular among the predominantly stage 6
respondents were also popular among the stage 5
respondents.
As a final test of the new stage 6 items, the revised
DIT was given to a cross-section of 36 undergraduates who
would not be expected to be principle moral reasoners.
Half of the sample was from an upper-level social
psychology class and the other half was from an
introductory psychology class from Western Kentucky
University.

The 36 scores on stage 6 ranged from zero to

16 with one exception (24).

The median of the stage 6

scores was 7 while the average stage 6 score for the group
was 8.

The participants' scores on stage 5 ranged from 5

to 29 with a median of 16 and a mean of 17.

The results

indicate that, as a group, the undergraduates did not
select this set of stage 6 items in a pattern consistent
with stage 6 thinkers as Kohlberg's theory would predict.
In summary, the results indicate that the new stage 6
items do not seem to clearly differentiate between stages 5
and 6 as they were designed to do.

We may have one large

pool of principled items that cannot be divided into stages
5 and 6 on the basis of participants' responses.

Chapter VIII
Discussion
Some would say that the effort to clearly differentiate
stage 5 people from stage 6 people is not possible in light
of how rare such moral reasoners seem to be.

It has been

the conviction of this author that not only is such a
distinction possible, but it is highly worthwhile given the
behavioral implications discussed earlier.
The results indicate that the three individuals who
made the stage 6 cutoff of 30 points were indeed stage 6
people according to the criteria set forth in this paper.
First, as just mentioned, they did meet the stage 6 cutoff.
The fact that three participants did make the cutoff is
itself strong testimony that there is strong internal
consistency among the stage 6 items given that the
likelihood of anyone making the cutoff of 30 by chance is
.000009.
Second, as predicted, they assigned more weight to
stage 5 items than any other stage, except stage 6.

Thus,

it has been shown that a population can be found for whom
the stage 6 criteria defined in this paper are central to
their moral reasoning.
Even though three people making the cutoff lends
support to the internal consistency of the new stage 6
items, it also indicates that stage 6 people are indeed

1,0
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rare and hard to find, just as Kohlberg's theory suggests.
Given that stage 6 reasoners are supposed to be so rare,
However,

finding three in this study may sound like a lot.

it should be remembered that the search procedure used to
locate the final 30 participants for this study was
extremely judicious.
It seems worthwhile to give a brief description of the
characteristics of the three individuals who made the stage
6 cutoff.

It should be noted, however, that these

characteristics are similar to those of the rest of the
sample since all participants were chosen according to the
same criteria.
The individual who scored the highest on stage 6 is
male, in his mid thirties, and currently works as a stock
broker.

The individual's higher education consists of a

bachelor of arts degree in German and a master's degree in
business administration.

Although the individual leads a

very active social life, this activity centers around
family and church events rather than humanitarian and civil
rights issues.
The second participant is also male, in his late
thirties, and is currently working toward his Ph.D. in
divinity school.

Besides giving sermons on a regular basis

this participant considers himself a social activist
concentrating mainly on criminal justice issues.

The

participant is also a member of the Democratic Socialist
Party.
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The third participant who made the cutoff score for
stage 6 grew up as the son of a minister.

This individual

worked as a parish minister for two years before going on
to obtain his doctorate in christian ethics from a major
American seminary.

The individual is now a professor of

religion with particular empahsis on christian ethics.

The

participant has also had a long history of involvement in
issues of war and peace, civil rights, and has been active
in nuclear arms controls.
Suggestions for Future Research
It might be worthwhile to move the cutoff of 30 for
,tage 6 down to 27 for two reasons.

First, the likelihood

of scoring 27 by chance is quite low at .0001.

Second, the

two individuals who scored 28 and 29 points on stage 6 also
assigned the highest percentage of remaining points to
stage 5 as did the three participants who scored 30 or
above.

Perhaps a cutoff of 30 was too stringent.

The next step in this study might be to look for stage
5 item clusters and stage 6 item clusters.

That is, is

there a certain group or cluster of items that people who
are predominantly stage 5 select?

Likewise, is there a

different group or cluster of items that people who are
predominantly stage 6 select?

It would be worthwhile to

show that the items empirically cluster at either stage 5
or stage 6.

However, the very small sample of stage 6

people in this study prevents this statistical analysis.
Although it was not planned as part of this thesis, a
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validation step that should be examined is 1 follow-up
interview of the stage 5 and stage 6 respondents using the
older form of the MJI which can be scored for stage 6.

The

convergent validity of the two tests could be used to
confirm that the individuals indicated as predominantly
stage 6 by the revised DIT are also classified as stage 6
according to the MJI.

If the MJI's results are not similar

to the revised DIT's, the implication would be that the new
items of the DIT are not actually defining stage 6
characteristics.

However, if the MJI results confirm the

revised DITs' results, then there would be strong support
that the new stage 6 items are indeed stage 6.
Additionally, about six of the purest stage 5
respondents (as identified by this study) should also be
administered the MJI.

This validation step will be done if

it is decided to pursue the publication of this study in a
professional journal.

Appendix A
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OPINICNS ABOUT SOCIAL PPOBLEMS
This questionaire is aimed at understanding how people think about social
problems. Nifferent people often have different opinions about questions of
right and wrong. There are no "right" answers in the way that there are right
answers to math problems. We would like you to tell us what you think about
several problem stories. Your answers are confidential.
Please give us the following information:
Name

female

Claesification (Circle one)
Age

Fresh

Soph

:r.

Sr.

male

Class and period

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

In this queutionaire you will be asked to give your opinion about several
ntotivu. Hera is a .tory as an example.
Frank Jones has been thinking about buying a car. Pe is marries, has twu
small children and earns an average income. The car he buys will Lc hie family's only car. It will be used mostly to get to work and drive around town,
but sometimes for vacation trips also. In trying to decide what ear to buy
Frank realized that there were a lot of questions to consider. Pelow is a list
of some of these questicnu.
If you acre Frank, how irnncrtant would each of these questions be in
deciding what car to buy?
Instruction(' for fart A:

.
(:
- ample

tliestion)

Cri the left hand aide check one of the spaces by each statement of a consideration.
For instance, if you think that statement !:1 ie not important in makine a decision about buyinL a car, ,ineck the space on tale right.)
Importance:
rca t

Much

Some

! t tile

ho
1. Wnether the car dealer was in the same tloc
as where Frank lives. (Note that in this
sample the person taking the queetionaire
did not think this wee important in v,aking

3.
4.
•/(
r...
.
C.
/
v
Instructions for fart P:

car Le more economical in the
!.nc :.. tnan a La car? (Note that a check
was put in the far left space to indicate
the opinion that this is an important issue
lp nakinr. a _iiescision about bueini: a
Whether the color was red, Frank's fav,I..rite
e
iffi.
l tr the cubic inch displacement was at
least 200. (Note that if you are unsure ate ut
what "cubic inch displacement" means, then
mar. It !:_po ilosortaLce.")
Would a large, recmy car be better than a
cmpact car?
Whether the front connibilies were differential. (hate that if a statement sounds
like gibberish or nonsense to you, mark it
"no imPOrtaneva")

(Sample Question)

From the list of questions above, select the most important one of the whole
group. Put the number of the most important question on the top line below.
Co likewise for your 2nd, rd and 4th moot important choice. (Note that the top
choices in this will Come from tnt statements that were checked on the far lefthand side—statements 42 and :,45 were thought to be very important. In deciding
what is the most important, a person would re-read ;,2 and //5, then pick one of
them as the most imbortant, then put the other one as "necond most important",
and so on.)
EsyZI

§ECINP ILSI_Ilati)RTANT

2_

THIRD YOZT IMPUTANT

3

ItURTH MOST IMPORTANT

W;O 7Er 1

,

In Furope a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was
one drug that the doctors thooght might save her. It was a form of radium that
a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. :he drug was expensive to
make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost to make. He
paid 5200 for the radium and charged 52000 for a small dose of the drug. The
sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but
he could only get together about 6100O 3 which is half of what it cost. He told
the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let
him pay later. But the druggist said, "), I discovered the drug and I'm going
to make money from it." Co Heinz got desperate and began to think about breaking into the man's store to steal the arug for his wife.
Chould Heinz steal the drug?
Should steal it

(Check one)

Can't decide

Should not steal it

IMPORTANCE:

.o______

1. Whether a community's laws are going to be
upheld.
2. Isn't it only natural for a loving husband
to care iic. much for his wife that Avid steal'
3. Is Heinz willing to rick getting shot as a
burglar or going to jail for the chance that
stealing the drug might help?
4. Whether Heinz is a professional wrestler, or
has considerable influence with professional
wrtl,r,.
is stealing for himself or
5. 7,11....::.. oael/ to nein _someone
druggiot's rights to his inven' C.
be rosPected.
. essence of living is more ,[..7. ,%!.
.7, the temihatioh of oyiug,
1.,,, .-g
+11Y - ; lndividoallY.
8. Do,,, Hey:: •iink his wife would steal f,,r
him if h.. ., re dilh.g?
O, What valid,. are going to be the basis for
governing how_PteCole act towards each other.
1C. Whether thc druggist is going to be allowed
to hide Lenind a worthless law which only
Protectli the rich anyhow.
11. What duties are created by another person's
right?
12. Whether the law in this case is getting in
the way of the most basl.: cloim of any
member of sooieli.
13. Whether the druggist dcserves to be robbed
for being o Lr_essir and cruel.
14. Would stealing in such a case bring about
mare total Atiglsi for the whole society , t nct

Frem the list of questions above, select the four most important:
Most Important
Second Most Important
Third Mot.,t Important
Fourth Most Important
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C.?
STUDFNT TAKE-CVFh
At Harvard University a group of students, calleu the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), believe that the University should not have an army 1-CiS
program. ST.:1 students are against the war in Viet Nam, and the army training
pr(,gram helps send men to fight in Viet !:am. The STS students demand that Harvard end the army 1,171, training program as a university course. This would mean
that Harvard students could not get army training as part of their regular course
work and not get credit for it towards their degrees. Agreeing with the SDS students, the Harvard professors voted to end the RC:'C program as a university
course. but the President of the University stated that he wanted to keep the
army program on campus as a course. lhe STS students felt that the President was
not going to pay attention to the faculty vote ur to their demands. So, one day
in April, two hundred SDS students walked into the univerity's administration building, and told everyone else to get out. They said they were doing tnis to force
Harvard to get rid of the army training program as a course.
SIculd the students have taken over the administration building?
Yes, they should take it over

Can't decide

(Check one)

No, they shouldn't
take it over

IMPORTANCE:
Great

Much

Some

No

Little

1-

J

,.

Are the students doing this to really help
otherleopl.e or are they doiEg it_just for kicka?
2. Do the students have any ri-T3ht to takeover
property that doesn't belong to them?
3. Pa the students realize that they might be arrested and fined, and even expelled from school?
4.-Woura-takEi over the -MIT:ling in tn-&-1-6-ng run
benefit more people to a greater extent?
IITfli sTudents-Ve-Come famous by takfng over
the building7
b. ftether the president stayed within the limits
of his authority in ignoripg_the faculty vcte,,
-7: W11171I-g-UnZver—a-Eger The pa-Iic and give
all_4tkdentq 4. lasi_name2
P. Is taking over a building consistent with
principles of justice?
9. Would allowing one student takeover encourage
may other student take2yers?
TE what situation should a person disrupt an
institution to insure juytice?
-TT. DTU The president bring this misunderstanding
on himself by being so unreasonable and unc9.229_EAtivM?
12. Whether running the university ought to be in
the hands of a few administrators or in the
hands of all the _peoples._
13. ITe-TEZ students -following principles which
thtly believe are
2!L. t!!1!t
-1-4.- Whether or not university decisions ought to
be respLcted by students.

From the list uf questions above, select the four most important:
?-'out Important
Second Most Important
Third Most Important
Fourth 1.!ust important
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ESCAPED PkISONER
A man had been sentenced to prison for 10 years. After one year, hcwever,
he escaped from prison, moved to a new area of the country, and took on tne name
of Thompson. For 8 years he worked hard, and gradually he saved enough money to
buy his OWT1 business. He was fair to his customerc, gave his employees top wages,
and gave most of his own profits to charity. Then one day, Mrs. Jones, an old
neighbor, recognized him as the man who had escaped from prison 8 years before,
ano whom the police had been looking for.
Should Mrs. Jones report Mr. Thompson to the police and have him sent back to
prison? (Check one)
Can't decide

Should report him

Should not report him

IMPORTANCE:
Groat

Much

'ore

Little
1.
,

2.
5.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

•

,
9.
..

10.
11.

is.

1 3.
14.

Hasn't Mr. Thompson been good enough for
such a long time to prove he isn't a bad
Person?
Every time someone escapee punishment fcr a
crime. doesn't that just encourage more crim e?
Wouldn't we be better off without prisons
and the oppression of our legal systems?
Has Mr. Thompson really paid his debt to
society?
If the law won't treat Mr. Thompson justly,
how should one act to insure justice in
this situation?
What benefits would prisons be apart from
society. especially for a charitable man?
How could anyone be so cruel and heartless
as to send Mr. ThomPson to PrisSr?
How inconvenient would it be to Mrs. Jones
if Mr. Thc,mpson's store cloned?
How woul: the will of the people and the
public c : test be served?
guuld it :, :uir to all the prisoners who
had to . • ;, out their full sentences if
Mr. H ”7.,n Woo ILT. Off7
pis ri.:,. 'ones a good /Ilene' Of Mr. Thompson
Wouldn't it be a citizen's duty to report
an escapod criminal, regardless of the
circumstances?
Pow should one act to insure justice in an
un ,vst situation?
Would going to prison do any good for Mr.
Fhomnson or protect anYhodi?

From the list of questions above, select the four most important:
Most Important
recond Most Important
Third Must Important
Fourth Most Important
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THE DOCTC.R'S DILEMMA
A lady was dying of cancer which could not be cured and she had only about
six months to live. She was in territle pain, tut she Was so wdak that a good
dose of pain—killer like morphine would make her die sooner. She was delirious
and almost crazy vice pain, and in her calm periods, she would ask the doctor
to give her enough morphine to kill her. She said she couldn't stand the pain
and that she was going to die in a few months anyway.
that should the doctor do?

(Check orle

He should give the lady an
overdose thaL will make her die

Can't decide

Should not give
the overdose

IMPORTANCE:
Gveat__ ?'uchSome

-

little

N
//nether the woman's family is ir favor of
giving ler the overdose or not
. Ts the doctor obligated by the same laws ae
everycody else if giving her an oveidose
would kg the game ag killing her?
5. *nether people would be much better off
without society regimenting their lives ard
evep their deaths.
4.
hether the doctor could make it appear
like an accident.
5.,,eLl the state have the right to force
—ntinued existence on those who don't
*Jr,t to live?
. Anat is the value of death prior to society'5
cerspective on personal valegs?
. Sould the doctor lose his license or go to
ail _it.p_e _gave her the oe_erdo_Su?
8. F.:y what principles should one decide what
tp dp in 1,hi g situation?
9. Whether the doctor has sympathy for the
woman's euffering or cares more about what
soele_tY wieht thiLk.
;5 helping to end another's life ever a
10.
-ecconsibl act of co peration?
11.
4.ether only mod should decide when a
.yreon's life should end.
12. drat values the doctor has set for himself
own rersonal code of behavior.
)!. 'ran society afford to let everybody end
tneir lives wh n they want to?
14• t,an society ol cw suicide or mercy killine
and still protect the lives of individuals
who want to live?
1.

I

From the list of questions above, select the four most important:
"ost Important
Second Vost Important
Third Most Important
Fourth Yost Important
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WEBSTER
Mr. Webster was the owner and manager of a gas station. He wanted to hire
another mechanic to help him, but geed mechanics were hard to find. The only
person he found who seemed to be a good mecnaeic was Mr. Lee, but he was Chihese.
While Mr. Webster himself didn't have anything against Crientale, he was afraid
to hire Mr. Lee becauee maee of Lis custc-rwr:_ Iidn't like Orientals. His customers might take their business elsewhere if Mr. Lee was working in the gas
station. When Mr. Lee asked Mr. Webster if he could have the job, Mr. Webster
said that he had already hired somebody else. Put Mr. Webster really had not
hired anybody, because he eould not find anybody who was a good mechanic besides Mr. Lee.
What ehould Yr. Webster have done?

(Check one)
Can't decide

Should have hired Mr. Lee

Should not have hired him

IMPORTANCE:
Great

Much

Some

Litt e

No
1

1.

I

t :.%
I
! 3.
i
i

4.

i
5.
C.
7.
E.

9.
11.
.

,•

Does the owner of a business have the right
tO make his own business decisions or net?
Whether there is a law that fortidc racial
OserimiLatiege .in hir_IIIK for jabs'.
nether Yr. Webeter ic prejudiced againct
Orientals himself or whether he means
=it
c hOr Icp1;ieg
a i
geord elt
Wrarelf Ttri
attention to his customers' wishee would be
teeL for,hlei blisinessWhat individual differences ought to be
relevant in deciding how society's roles
4re Ulled?
Whether the greeuy and competitive capitallstic system ought to be comj,letely abandone d.
To a mzelority of people in Mr. Aebsterie
society feel like nie customers or are a
leletcrild_ietainst orcludice?
nether tiring capable men like Mr. Lee
w:uld uee talente that would otheiwise he
.,
. :et, job to Mr. Lee be c.e.. .
% Ititer's oth morel
eie:,
so hard-hearted ,.
Could .. - :
king how much it e..
refuee toe j,tt,
te I're._ Lee?
,::::J
- ei hirinr - 7_
, increaSe hi L Lu,,
:77.ent

14.

to

case.
t„1, ehouide't he be helped
• .ene'e
• or o' what_ vcu eet tack from him?
le -e does a society's resronsibility
t
Title* er'ate for indivieuele?

From the list of questions above, eclect the four mont important:
Lost Important
Second Mest Important
!hird Meet Important
Fourth mest Important
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NEWSPAPER
Fred, a senior in high achool, wanted to publish a mimeographed newspaper
for students so that he ccull express many oI his opinions. He wanted to speak
out against the war in Vie' 'am and to speak out against some of the school's
roles, like the rule forbrr:::g buys to wear long hair. When Fred started his
%ewspaper, he asked his 1)11
.;,1 for permission. The principal said it would
all right if before ever) foelication Fred would turn in all his articles
7
the principal's approval. Fred agreed and turned in several articles for
The principal approved all of them and Fred published two issues of
-- • : in the next two weeks. Put the principal had not expected that Fred's
: tculd receive so much attention. Students were so excited by the pa—
began to organize protests against the hair regulation and other
Angry parents objected to Fred's opinions. They phoned the prin—
.nal tel
.,- his that the newspaper was unpatriotic and should not be published.
• • 1,ri!.c:. 1 must now decide whether or not to stop the paper.

Should the principal stop the newspaper?
Should stop it

(Check one)
Should not stop it

Can't decide

IMPORTANCE:
Great

Much

Some _ little

tr
Is the principal more responsible to
students or to the parents?
2. Fid the principal give his word that the
newspaper could Le published for a long
h-ne, or did he just promise to approve
nti§oAper one issue at a time?
3.'1 the students start proteet::
•no _priicaozal stcrrvd I. ntte..;naPer'
a.•
_ threatene;
4:1fare of the -:
give
::incinal have in
7rr?
f
f:
r havt
1.

{

r

,
..
r
,

_

L

to

.. .
would tie Le preventing full aiecusaiuh of
i ,..::7-tart 1,rrt,1,.-TE:'

7.
.

.

.

... , .
:0 a, ..,i t:.., right of fre ,
to abuse
who 1,_ goin

. . .

: wa, r.Ailly loyal to his school
'ic. ti, his country.
would stopping the paper have
on the student's education in critical
thinking and judgments?
11. -nether Fred was in anyway violating the
rights of others in publishing his can
P10.1911Wa
. ahether the principal shoulj he influenctd
by some angry parents when II is the
Irinci, ..(.at know:: t._.1.,t iii,. is going i:n
ti., .
.
!_ne n;_r.spaper to
' •.
.
—
J..:Ipal to allow
.._,,, ,;,::,....:,:t l'• ,L11. r t
raapprove and it
the- paper even if par,.
ol?
•jr,rher oi :_r
rrl,'nt :::—
....1 f.,.7

,

*

Frurn tOe Aiat of questioLc, above, celL.,

:

important:

Important
Second riA,:t. Important
Third roct Important
Fourth rest Important
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